The ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: impact on trade flows and external trade barriers by Calvo-Pardo, Hector et al.
  
 
 
 
CEP Discussion Paper No 930 
May 2009 
The ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: 
Impact on Trade Flows and External Trade Barriers 
Hector Calvo-Pardo, Caroline Freund 
and Emanuel Ornelas 
 
 
    
Abstract 
Using detailed data on trade and tariffs from 1992-2007, we examine how the ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement has affected trade with non-members and external tariffs facing non-members. First, we 
examine the effect of preferential and external tariff reduction on import growth from ASEAN 
insiders and outsiders across HS 6-digit industries. We find no evidence that preferential liberalization 
has led to lower import growth from non-members. Second, we examine the relationship between 
preferential tariff reduction and MFN tariff reduction. We find that preferential liberalization tends to 
precede external tariff liberalization. To examine whether this tariff complementarity is a result of 
simultaneous decision making, we use the scheduled future preferential tariff reductions (agreed to in 
1992) as instruments for actual preferential tariff changes after the Asia crisis. The results remain 
unchanged, suggesting that there is a causal relationship between preferential and MFN tariff 
reduction. We also find that external liberalization was relatively sharper in the products where 
preferences are likely to be most damaging, proving further support for a causal effect. Overall, our 
results imply that the ASEAN agreement has been a force for broader liberalization.  
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I. Introduction 
 
 Regional integration has become the main form of trade liberalization since 
the early 1990s. After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994, no significant 
progress has been made at multilateral liberalization. By contrast, a new regional trade 
agreement (RTAs) is announced almost every month. According to the World Trade 
Organization, more than 300 RTAs are currently in force and all but one (Mongolia) 
of its 153 members participate in at least one of those arrangements. Given the rising 
prominence of bilateral and regional trade liberalization, it is important that we 
understand their implications for world trade. 
 
This is even more important because, unlike multilateral liberalization, which 
most economists believe to be largely beneficial for both liberalizing countries and 
bystanders, preferential liberalization is controversial. The reason comes from its 
inherent discriminatory nature: when forming an RTA, members agree to lower trade 
barriers to each other but their tariffs on imports from outsiders remain unconstrained. 
This can induce members to substitute inefficiently produced imports from bloc 
members for imports previously sourced efficiently from nonmember countries. Such 
trade diversion harms the nonmembers through lost markets, as well as the members 
through reduced tariff revenue. However, like broader trade liberalization, the RTA is 
also likely to enhance trade of the goods that are efficiently sourced within the bloc.  
This trade creation will enhance welfare. These two forces suggest that preferential 
liberalization can in principle be either welfare-enhancing or welfare-reducing. 
Ultimately, the verdict must be empirical, and may be different for different trading 
blocs. Trade creation forces may prevail over trade diverting ones in some cases, but 
the reverse could be true in other cases. 
 
 In this paper, we assess the consequences of the ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement (AFTA) on trade and external tariffs. AFTA was formed in 1993 by 
Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, 
and in the second half of the 1990s it expanded to incorporate Vietnam, Laos, 
Myanmar and Cambodia. Internal trade liberalization within the bloc has not been as 
abrupt as in some other trading blocs (e.g. NAFTA). Instead, liberalization has 
evolved gradually, though steadily. Furthermore, there are significant differences in 
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the speed and size of tariff reductions across countries and across products. This 
variation helps us to assess how preferential liberalization has affected trade and 
tariffs. 
 
 We first examine trade effects. We find that the formation of the trade bloc has 
had a meaningful positive impact on the trade flows among members. Interestingly, 
this does not seem to have happened at the expense of trade with outsiders. Growth of 
imports from nonmembers did not falter after the formation and the enlargements of 
AFTA. Nor is growth in imports from nonmembers significantly different from 
growth in imports from members subsequent to AFTA. 
 
 To examine the effect of AFTA on trade in more detail, we focus on the 
impact of preferential and multilateral tariff changes on intra-bloc import growth and 
import growth from excluded countries. For the analysis, we rely on detailed data on 
preferential and MFN applied tariffs at the product level for all ASEAN members, 
since the bloc was created in 1993 through 2007. This allows us to use a large set of 
fixed effects that control for a wide range of unobserved shocks. We find strong 
evidence that reductions in MFN tariffs have stimulated trade with nonmembers, but 
no evidence that preferential tariff reduction has reduced trade with nonmembers.   
 
 Next, we examine the effect of preferential tariff reduction on external tariffs. 
It is possible that preferential and MFN tariffs are related to each other, and that 
governments respond to changes in the preferential tariffs by adjusting MFN tariffs. 
We therefore proceed to analyze the reaction of the bloc members’ trade policies vis-
à-vis outsiders. Specifically, we ask: Has the reduction of tariffs on within-ASEAN 
trade led its members to change their barriers on imports form excluded countries? If 
so, have they gone up or down as a result of ASEAN, and by how much? 
 
 Several theoretical forces have been advanced suggesting that the formation of 
a free trade agreement such as AFTA should induce changes in external tariffs. But 
just as in the trade creation/trade diversion debate, there are reasons supporting 
changes is either direction. Once again, the resolution of the debate must be empirical. 
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 Our dataset provides enough variation to allow us to obtain very precise 
estimates on whether products with relatively large preferences have been liberalized 
or protected to the same extent as other products. It is also helpful that the ASEAN 
members generally set their applied MFN tariffs well below their bound rates at the 
World Trade Organization, so we do not need to worry with this potential institutional 
constraint. 
 
In line with recent analyses of regionalism in developing countries, our results 
imply that AFTA is a “building bloc” to free trade. There is strong evidence that 
preferences induce a faster decline in external tariffs than otherwise would occur. The 
results are both statistically and economically significant. For example, in a country 
where imports of a certain product from outsiders faced a 10% MFN tariff but were 
granted duty free access if stemming from other ASEAN members, the member 
would subsequently tend to reduce its MFN tariff on that product by between 2½ and 
4½ percentage points. 
 
While the correlation between changes in external and preferential tariffs is 
unquestionable, determining causality is trickier. For example, it may be that some 
products are easier to liberalize than others, and trade in those products tends to be 
liberalized both regionally and multilaterally. We use three main distinct strategies to 
determine if this is a causal effect and find evidence that it is. First, evidence of “tariff 
complementarity” remains strong if we use lagged changes in preferential tariffs (or 
preferential margins) as our main regressor. Second, we look for and find differential 
effects precisely when either the theory or the practice tells us we should find them. 
Specifically, no tariff complementarity arises when the margin of preferences is too 
small to be meaningful for exporters. Furthermore, stronger tariff complementarity is 
obtained in sectors where the margin of preferences is meaningful and the share of 
intra-bloc imports is higher, as theory suggests. 
 
Third, we employ an instrumental variables approach that takes advantage of a 
unique feature of our dataset: the agreed speed and depth of internal liberalization of 
the six original members in their 1992 negotiations. As it turns out, observed changes 
in preferences have not corresponded to the planned ones in 1992. Numerous reasons 
may have caused this discrepancy. For us, this is especially valuable because the 
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planned internal liberalization can serve as an instrument for the actual one. While 
they are strongly correlated, the negotiated preferences should not have an 
independent effect on the incentives of countries to alter their external tariffs. To 
strengthen this rationale, in the IV regressions we restrict the sample to the post-Asian 
crisis period, during which trade policies were significantly affected. Interestingly, the 
qualitative results of our IV and OLS estimations are very similar (quantitatively, they 
are higher under the IV procedure). Replacing the actual with the planned preferential 
tariffs in the OLS estimation also delivers similar results. 
 
Taking all of our results together, we conclude that AFTA has promoted trade 
within the bloc without hurting trade with outsiders. An important reason for this is 
the unilateral reductions in external tariffs that ASEAN members implemented as a 
result of their liberalization vis-à-vis each other. These reductions suggest that AFTA 
provides an important contribution to the global process of multilateral liberalization. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In the next section we 
discuss the related theoretical literature and the empirical findings. We provide a 
general view of ASEAN and discuss the data in Section III.  In Section IV, we 
examine the impact of tariffs on trade.  In Section V, we develop the empirical 
analysis on the effects of AFTA on external tariffs.  Section VI concludes. 
 
 
II. Trade creation, trade diversion, and import barriers on outsiders 
 
We know since Viner (1950) that the formation of a free trade agreement 
(FTA) can lead to trade creation and/or trade diversion. The former arises when the 
FTA promotes trade among the members without disrupting trade with nonmembers, 
and tends to be efficiency-enhancing. By contrast, trade diversion arises when the 
FTA promotes trade among members at the expense of trade with bloc outsiders, and 
tends to be efficiency-reducing. 
 
There have been attempts to pin down theoretically the characteristics that 
make FTAs more trade creating or more trade diverting. Frankel (1997) develops the 
“natural trading partners” hypothesis, which states broadly that agreements between 
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countries that already trade significantly (in particular geographically close countries 
and those that share cultural characteristics that reduce transaction costs, such as 
language) are the ones most likely to be trade creating. Although theoretically this 
does not need to always hold, as Bhagwati and Panagariya (1999) point out, Frankel 
(1997) finds evidence consistent with the natural trade partners hypothesis in a 
number of regression analyses based on the gravity equation with country-level trade 
flows. 
 
Lee and Shin (2006) extend the approach of Frankel (1997) and estimate a 
gravity model with year dummies and with both random and fixed effects to assess 
trade creation and trade diversion in 175 countries using data from 1948 to 1999. The 
key trade creation variable is a dummy that is one if both countries are members of a 
common RTA; the key trade diversion variable is a dummy that is one if one country 
belongs to an RTA and the other does not belong to that RTA. Lee and Shin interact 
these variables with geographical and common language variables to identify whether 
trade creation and trade diversion are different for “natural” trade patterns. 
 
In most specifications, Lee and Shin (2006) confirm that RTAs increase 
bilateral trade between members. The magnitudes are around 50 percent, but if the 
countries share a common border this effect increases to up to 200 percent. Similarly, 
the closer the countries are from each other, the larger is trade creation. On the other 
hand, RTAs are never found to reduce trade between members and nonmembers 
significantly. In fact, in most specifications RTAs are estimated to increase trade 
between members and nonmembers, from 6 to 15 percent. Trade with nonmembers 
grows more for RTAs with a smaller average distance between their members and 
when more members of the RTA have common borders or share a common language. 
Having the trade creation and trade diversion estimates in hand, Lee and Shin then 
predict the average trade impact of several proposed RTAs in Asia. They find in 
particular that the trade effects of AFTA are significantly positive.1 
 
                                                 
1 Lee and Park (2005) develop a similar analysis, also predicting significant trade creation but no trade 
diversion from the formation of Asian RTAs, including the expansion of AFTA to incorporate China, 
Japan and Korea. 
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Clausing (2001) develops a detailed (at the product-level) analysis of the 
Canada-United States free trade agreement (CUSTA) of 1988. She also finds that 
trade creation tends to be the rule, and trade diversion the exception, in most sectors.2 
A somewhat different picture is presented by Chang and Winters (2002), who find 
evidence that the formation of Mercosur hurt outsiders. However, Mercosur is distinct 
from CUSTA, NAFTA and all the Asian RTAs, as it is a customs union (CU), rather 
than a free trade agreement.3 
 
Now, while structural characteristics of FTA members can make the bloc more 
or less prone to be trade creating/diverting, perhaps even more critical is to understand 
the members’ trade policy reactions to the formation of the bloc, in particular their 
incentives to alter their trade taxes on the imports from outsiders. This follows from 
two simple observations. First, the country’s external tariffs can be altered 
unilaterally. Second, the higher the difference between a member’s preferential tariffs 
and its external tariffs, the greater is the discrimination and the scope for trade 
diversion. Thus, if the formation of a preferential trading bloc is accompanied by 
reductions in external tariffs, the arrangement is more likely to enhance aggregate 
world welfare without harming excluded countries. In contrast, if the trading bloc 
raises trade barriers against excluded countries (or fails to reduce them), diversion of 
external trade to bloc members is more likely, harming outsiders and possibly 
countries in the bloc as well. Therefore, the trade, as well as the welfare consequences 
of an RTA, depends critically on the member countries’ tariff response. But if the 
original choice of MFN tariffs resulted from economic and political considerations by 
the government, those motives would lead to different outcomes when constrained by 
the presence of preferential rates. Accordingly, we should indeed expect the external 
tariffs to change after the formation of a trading bloc. 
 
                                                 
2 In a more structural approach, Krishna (2003) estimates trade diversion and trade creation in 24 
hypothetical bilateral trade agreements, finding that in 80 percent of the cases trade creation outweighs 
trade diversion. Furthermore, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) show that, if one takes into account the 
endogeneity in the formation of trading blocs, the trade impact of RTAs is much larger than 
conventional estimates suggest. 
3 In CUs, unlike in FTAs, members are required to align their external tariffs. This can lead to very 
different tariff-setting behavior, as Estevadeordal et al. (2008) confirm to be the case for Latin 
America’s trading blocs. 
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There is a sizeable theoretical literature that explores the optimal external 
tariff response of countries following the formation of FTAs. In a standard model, 
with a welfare-maximizing government, optimal external tariffs are likely to fall in a 
free trade area precisely to limit the welfare costs of trade diversion [Bagwell and 
Staiger (1999), Freund (2000), Bond et al. (2004)]. The intuition is that the welfare 
cost of trade diversion induces governments to lower external tariffs to recapture tariff 
revenue and improve economic efficiency. 
 
When political-economy motives are incorporated, the results are ambiguous. 
For example, Richardson (1993) and Ornelas (2005a, 2005b) find that, upon the 
formation of a free trade area, lobbying will decline and external tariffs fall, as the 
import-competing sector contracts and becomes weaker politically. This force will be 
more important, the greater the share imports stemming from the bloc partners. 
However, in a different model, Panagariya and Findlay (1996) find that countries in a 
free trade area will raise protection against outsiders because lobbying in favor of 
tariffs against the partner will be diverted to lobbying for a greater external tariff. 
Furthermore, it is not just existing trade blocs that matter. As Bagwell and Staiger 
(2004) show, the mere potential for a future trade agreement may affect the extent of 
current tariff reduction that can be negotiated multilaterally. The threat of “bilateral 
opportunism” reduces the extent of multilateral tariff reduction because current global 
trade agreements can be later diluted by bilateral preferences. 
 
By contrast, the empirical literature on the effect of RTA formation on 
external tariffs is still in its infancy. Bohara, Gawande and Sanguinetti (2004) 
examine tariff adjustments in Argentina following the formation of Mercosur, finding 
some support for the hypothesis that the decline of industries driven by the formation 
of a trading bloc leads to lower external tariffs. Similarly, Estevadeordal et al. (2008) 
examine the direct impact of changes in preferential tariffs on changes in MFN tariffs 
in ten Latin American countries and one hundred industries over 12 years. Using a 
number of empirical techniques to extract causality, they find that preferences in free 
trade areas lead to a decline in external tariffs, whereas the effects are negligible in 
customs unions. In contrast, Limão (2006) finds that the United States was more 
reluctant to lower tariffs in the Uruguay Round for products where preferences were 
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granted. His results imply that trade preferences lead to less multilateral tariff 
reduction. Limão and Karacaovali (2008) find similar results for the European Union. 
 
Recently, Lendle (2007) has developed the first analysis of the trade policy 
reactions to regionalism in Asia. Specifically, Lendle evaluates whether products 
receiving preferential treatment in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand 
under the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement underwent greater reduction in MFN tariffs 
during the late 1990s and early 2000s than goods that did not receive preferential 
treatment. The approach resembles that of Limão (2006), in that he estimates the 
change in the MFN tariff from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s (the precise years 
vary with the country in analysis due to data availability) on a dummy that represents 
whether the country offered preferential treatment under AFTA. Lendle finds 
evidence of tariff complementarity for Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, where 
the MFN tariffs of preferential products were reduced by more (between one and five 
percentage points) than for non-preferential products. In contrast, the results for 
Malaysia, which has the lowest average MFN among the four countries studied, are 
somewhat mixed, varying according to the specification. While Lendle’s study is very 
instructive about the developments in internal and external liberalization in ASEAN, 
it does not take into account the variations in the extent and the speed of intra-bloc 
liberalization, which are significant. 
 
 
III. The ASEAN free trade agreement 
 
 The ASEAN Free Trade Agreement was signed by Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand in 1992, entering into force in 1993. It 
consisted of a schedule of preferential tariff reductions, to be implemented 
progressively until 2008 (later postponed to 2010). Goods were divided in five 
categories: Inclusion List-Fast Track (IL-FT); Inclusion List-Normal (IL-N); 
Temporary Exclusion List (TEL); Sensitive List (SL); and General Exceptions (GE). 
The group titles reveal their meanings quite accurately. IL-FT goods were expected to 
have preferential tariffs reduced to 0-5% by 2000, while IL-N products had until 2003 
to reach that level. TEL items were expected to be phased into the Inclusion List by 
2000 for most manufactured products, and by 2003 for unprocessed agricultural 
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products. SL goods corresponded mainly to unprocessed agricultural products that 
were granted a more flexible arrangement for phasing into the Inclusion List. Finally, 
GE products were permanently excluded from the agreement. In the second half of the 
1990s, four other countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) joined the 
group. They were incorporated into the existing scheme for preferential liberalization, 
although with more flexibility both with respect to the products added to the Inclusion 
List and with respect to the timing of liberalization. 
 
 Overall, AFTA has proved to be a “deep” free trade agreement, at least 
relative to other arrangements among developing countries (probably second only to 
Mercosur in this respect). There are several reasons for that. First, because of AFTA’s 
coverage is comprehensive (over 90 percent of product classifications were in the 
Inclusion List from the outset of the liberalization program). Second, the liberalization 
program is very ambitious, ultimately requiring free/near-free trade within the area for 
the large majority of products. Third, and most importantly, AFTA members have 
indeed—unlike members of many other developing-country trading blocs—largely 
stuck to their announced goal of reaching near free intra-bloc trade. 
 
 AFTA’s successful implementation does not imply, however, that the 1992 
original preference-granting schedule has been followed strictly by its signatories. In 
fact, there have been numerous updates and amendments to the schedule.4 It is not 
uncommon for members to move slower than the schedule originally specified, and 
sometimes they actually move faster. This implies that actual liberalization, while 
correlated, is not fully dictated by the previously negotiated tariffs. This feature of 
AFTA turns out to be very useful for our identification strategy of the effects of 
preferences on countries’ choices of MFN tariffs, as we discuss in section V. Other 
features of the AFTA liberalization process are useful for our analysis as well. First, 
the speed and degree of intra-bloc liberalization vary across products and across 
member countries, as well as over time, generating significant variation in our dataset. 
Second, particularly large changes in the liberalization process were brought about 
during the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, which can be safely regarded as exogenous to 
                                                 
4 For example, agricultural goods were incorporated only in the early 2000s to the schedules. See 
Lendle (2007) for a brief description of those changes and http://www.aseansec.org/4920.htm for 
details. 
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AFTA. Third, as in any free trade agreement (but unlike in customs unions), bloc 
members are fully independent to define their external (MFN) tariffs.5 
 
 In parallel to the broader tariff negotiations under AFTA, other specific, 
sectoral liberalization programs (e.g. in information technology products and in 
automobiles) were also implemented by ASEAN members in the early 2000s, 
accelerating the liberalization process within the bloc. To the extent that these sectoral 
agreements affected the tariffs of the ASEAN members, their impact is incorporated 
in our analysis. Other institutional elements that are likely to affect our relationships 
include non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and schemes like the members’ duty drawback 
system (which provides duty-free treatment of imported intermediate goods for 
producing exported final goods).6 We do not incorporate those issues explicitly 
mainly because of unavailability of appropriate data. While we do not expect NTBs or 
the bloc’s duty drawback system to be the driving forces in our analysis, their effects 
are nevertheless subsumed in our estimations, which provide the net effect of 
preferences on external tariffs.7 
 
III.1 – Data 
 
 We work with a comprehensive data set that includes information on trade, 
MFN tariffs and preferential tariffs, implemented and scheduled, for all ten members 
of the ASEAN Free Trade Area. The information on preferential tariffs was provided 
by the ASEAN Secretariat.8 The implemented rates are those actually employed by 
the member countries. The main novelty of the dataset is the scheduled rates, which 
are the ones the members planned to apply when the AFTA negotiations were 
concluded, in 1992.  The MFN tariffs and the trade data at the HS 6-digit level come 
                                                 
5 On certain occasions, MFN rates have actually dropped below the preferential rates for AFTA 
members (see e.g. Ando 2007). Naturally, preferences become redundant in those cases, and AFTA 
exporters simply use the prevailing MFN rate. Accordingly, in our empirical analysis we set the 
preferential tariffs to the level of their MFN counterparts when we observe such discrepancies. 
6 We thank Fukunari Kimura for pointing this out. 
7 NTBs are likely to weaken the relationship between preferential and MFN tariffs. For example, a 
large preferential margin may be innocuous in the presence of NTBs on intra-ASEAN trade, therefore 
having no effect on the governments’ incentives to alter external tariffs. Similarly, if the NTBs are on 
non-ASEAN imports, MFN tariffs become less important, and governments may not bother to change 
them despite sizable preferential margins. Duty drawbacks may work in the opposite direction. As 
Cadot et al. (2003) show theoretically and confirm for Mercosur, duty drawbacks provide an additional 
reason for external tariffs to fall after the formation of a regional trading bloc. 
8 We thank the Asian Development Bank for very helpful assistance in obtaining the data. 
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from the World Integrated Trade System. An important advantage of our data is that 
they are very disaggregated, at the product (6-digit) level. Furthermore, we have a 
long sample, ranging from 1993 to 2007 (plus data in previous years for trade flows 
and MFN tariffs). On the negative side, the panel is unbalanced, with a significant 
amount of missing data, especially in the first half of the sample.  
 
 The aggregate trade data used in Section III.3 are from the IMF direction of 
trade statistics. These data go back further than the WITS data and a great effort is 
made to ensure they capture aggregate bilateral flows.   
 
III.2 – Tariffs 
 
Table 1 shows the (simple) average preferential and MFN tariffs, plus the 
difference between the two (margin), for each of the ten ASEAN members since the 
outset of AFTA in 1993 (or since the entry year for the later entrants). Blank spaces 
reflect missing data (the year 2001 is not shown because preferential tariffs are 
missing for all members that year). The overall trend is of falling MFN and 
preferential rates, but this is not always the case, even though we are looking at 
average levels. The most notable exception is Thailand, where during the Asian crisis 
MFN tariffs temporarily peaked at high levels. 
 
These points become clearer when we look at figure 1, where we display the 
time series of the three variables from table 1 for the countries where data is available 
for most years, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The downward trend in 
intra-ASEAN tariff rates is very transparent for all of them, although the speed and 
the magnitude of the changes vary, both being higher for the initially more protected 
countries, Indonesia and Philippines. In those countries external tariffs have fallen as 
well, but the changes have been minimal since 2003. The pattern of the average MFN 
tariff in Malaysia has been more erratic, having gone up right after the Asian currency 
crisis and come down only slightly since 2005, but remaining above the pre-crisis 
level. With respect to the average margin of preference, the pattern again differs 
among the three countries: it is generally (but not always) increasing for Indonesia 
and Malaysia, and it is mostly (but not always) decreasing in the Philippines, 
reflecting the large drops in the MFN tariff there. Figure 1 therefore makes clear the 
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large degree of variation in external and preferential tariffs in our sample, even when 
we look at average levels. 
 
III.3 – Aggregate trade 
 
We now look at aggregate trade data for the six original ASEAN members to 
examine how trade patterns change following the implementation of trade 
preferences.9 The purpose is to identify whether there are significant trend changes in 
the trade growth with members and nonmembers subsequent to the agreement. 
 
 Figure 2 shows the share of imports that stems from ASEAN members, 
collectively and for each of the six individual countries, 13 years before and after the 
introduction of preferences in 1993. The figures show that, for the bloc as a whole and 
for most members, the share of imports coming from partner countries has increased 
steadily since 1993, although no clear trend is visible before that year. This suggests 
that the preferences were effective in affecting trade patterns. However, it does not 
hint at whether this reflects the prevalence of trade diversion or trade creation, since 
both imply an increase in the share of preferential imports. 
 
 In figure 3 we then plot, for the same period, the volumes of intra-AFTA 
imports and imports from outside the bloc. The figures suggest no evidence of 
important trade diversion, as imports from AFTA nonmembers kept increasing after 
the formation of the bloc in most years for all countries.10 Imports from within the 
bloc increased at a higher pace, though, which explains the rise in the share of intra-
AFTA trade. These trends are consistent with trade creation dominating trade 
diversion in AFTA, although other explanations are also plausible. The figures also 
make clear that import growth with members and with nonmembers are highly 
correlated, implying that other factors besides AFTA are important drivers of 
aggregate trade growth. 
 
                                                 
9 Trade data for the four late entrants are available only for recent years. 
10 The important exception is 1997, where trade flows fell significantly. That drop was largely 
unrelated to AFTA, however, reflecting instead the Asian currency crisis. In fact, in that year imports 
from members and nonmembers fell alike. 
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Table 2 shows the mean growth rates of external and internal imports before 
and after 1993. While several factors beyond AFTA have probably affected trade 
growth rates in the ASEAN countries (the currency crisis of 1997-1998 being only the 
most prominent one), a few regularities are worth noting. First, intra-AFTA trade 
grows faster than external trade in five of the six original members even in the pre-
agreement period (the only exception being Indonesia). This suggests that the choice 
of members was not random, but rather influenced by their growing trade ties. In the 
post-agreement period, internal trade growth was faster than external import growth in 
all countries, and by a significantly larger margin than it was before 1993. 
 
Although using aggregate trade data obviously makes the sample very small, 
we can still perform t-tests on the difference in the means of the pre-union and post-
union growth rates and also between the growth rate of internal trade and trade with 
nonmembers. As the results reported in table 2 show, the t-tests of the difference in 
the mean growth rates before and after the agreement are not conclusive. On the other 
hand, the difference in the mean growth rates of imports from members and 
nonmembers are different enough for Indonesia and the Philippines in the post-AFTA 
period that the t-test on their difference is statistically significant, despite the very 
small sample. 
 
Furthermore, if increased trade with bloc members displaced imports from 
third countries, we would expect to see a decline in the correlation between internal 
and external trade growth subsequent to the formation of AFTA. However, as shown 
in the last column of table 2, the correlation between external trade growth and 
internal trade goes up in five out of the six countries—and by a large amount in 
Thailand and the Philippines. The correlation falls in the post-1993 period only in 
Brunei, and the drop was minimal. 
 
 
IV. The effect of tariffs on trade in ASEAN 
 
 Having looked at the pattern of aggregate trade and average tariffs in the 
ASEAN countries, we turn now to examine the relationship between imports and 
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tariffs. Specifically, we study how MFN and preferential tariffs affect import growth 
from AFTA members and from outsiders.  
 
For this exercise, as well as for our study of the relationship between the two 
types of tariffs in the next section, we aggregate the yearly data in three-year periods. 
This helps to downplay unnecessary noise in the dataset due to missing data. The six 
periods are: 1. the pre-AFTA period (before 1993); 2. the early years of the agreement 
(1993-1995); 3. the Asian crisis period (1996-1998); 4. the post-crisis period (1999-
2001); 5. the effective integration of the new members (2002-2004); 6. further intra-
bloc liberalization by all members (2005-2007). We lose little with this approach, 
since the dataset remains very large. 
 
 To control for other factors that might affect trade patterns, we run the 
following regression: 
 
(1) dln(Mijtg) = γjtg + β1dPREFijt + β2dMFN + εijt , 
 
where Mijtg corresponds to imports of product i, country j, period t, from group g = 
members, nonmembers. PREFijt denotes the preferential tariff (in percentage points) 
enjoyed by exporters of good i to country j in period t, whereas MFNijt corresponds to 
the tariff (in percentage points) that non-ASEAN exporters have to incur. d indicates 
first difference. γjtg is a country-period fixed effect for group g. The country-year 
effects control for general liberalization and business cycle effects. To account for 
trends in country-specific demand for good i, we also try including country-product 
fixed effects in the regression. In addition, we run the regression using both the 
percentage point change in tariffs (dPREF and dMFN) and the percent change in 
tariffs (dln(1+MFN/100) and dln(1+PREF/100)). The advantage of the percentage 
point change is that it puts more weight on large changes. The advantage of the 
percent change is that the coefficient can be interpreted as an elasticity. 
Coefficient β1 represents the quasi-elasticity or elasticity of imports from 
group g with respect to the preferential rate, PREF, for given MFN tariff.11 A 
                                                 
11 Notice that we look at the effect on ln(1+PREF/100) on ln(M). Thus, β1 tells us how much M 
changes, in percentage terms, when (1+PREF/100) increases by 1%. Since PREF/100 is in general 
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negative β1 implies that, if PREF rises (thereby increasing the cost of imports from 
members and lowering the margin of preferences), imports from group g fall. We 
expect this to be the case when g = members, unless preferences are not being 
effectively used. In contrast, we expect β1 ≥ 0 when g = nonmembers, with a greater 
value indicating greater trade diversion effects. Coefficient β2 represents the impact of 
changes in the MFN tariff, for given PREF, on changes in imports from group g. A 
negative β2 implies that, if the MFN tariff rises (thereby increasing the cost of imports 
from nonmembers as well as the margin of preferences), imports from group g fall. 
We expect this to be the case when g = nonmembers. In contrast, an estimated β2 of 
any sign is conceivable when g = members. If preferences are used for most products, 
β2 > 0 for g = members is likely as a result of trade diversion. But if preferences are 
not effectively used, even imports from within the bloc are negatively affected by 
increases in the MFN rates.12 In that case, β2 < 0 for g = nonmembers as well. 
 
 Table 3 reports the results.13 The first two columns show the outcomes of the 
regressions on tariffs in first differences. Imports from ASEAN outsiders are, as 
expected, negatively impacted by the members’ MFN tariffs. Intra-ASEAN trade is 
negatively affected only by the preferential rates. Surprisingly, preferential tariffs 
appear to lower also imports from bloc outsiders. This is broadly consistent with some 
analyses that indicate that much of intra-ASEAN trade is in intermediate goods (e.g. 
Fouquin, Hiratsuka and Kimuara 2006), with the implication that trade with bloc 
members and nonmembers are complementary.14 Note, on the other hand, that the 
                                                                                                                                            
small relative to unity, a 1% change in (1+PREF/100) can be approximated by a one percentage point 
change in PREF. Similar interpretation applies to β2. 
12 A typical concern among ASEAN analysts is indeed that preferential margins have become too small 
in most sectors to have a practical effect. After all, eligibility to the preferential rate requires complying 
with complex rules of origin, which often imply large administrative costs. If the margin of preference 
is too low, it will then be best to simply use the MFN rate to avoid incurring in such an administrative 
burden. Several scholars (e.g. Baldwin 2006) have indeed claimed that the utilization rates are very low 
in ASEAN, around just five to ten percent. Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing (2008) note, however, that 
it is unclear what the primary source of this information is, since the ASEAN Secretariat does not 
publish information about utilization rates. Still, since a significant fraction of the preferential margins 
seem indeed too low to be useful, the preferential system under AFTA may have little practical 
importance for the trade flows in the region. In fact, Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing (2008) find that 
preferences have a positive effect on intra-bloc trade only when the preferential margins are very 
high—over 25 percentage points. 
13 In these and the subsequent regressions, we use robust standard errors and cluster observations at the 
country-product level. 
14 The negative effect of each tariff on imports from both bloc insiders and outsiders may reflect also 
income effects, in addition to the substitution effects they are designed to capture. We thank Warwick 
McKibbin for this observation. 
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magnitudes are consistent with preferences in ASEAN being operative: imports from 
excluded countries appear to be more negatively affected by the MFN tariffs than by 
the preferential rates. The next two columns report results with the percentage change 
in tariffs, the results are qualitatively similar. 
 
 Preferences may, however, be correlated with trends in country-specific 
demands for individual products. This would generate trends in imports; if tariffs are 
correlated with those trends, which is plausible, then regression (1) would be 
misspecified, misattributing part of the effects of such trends on trade to tariffs. To 
avoid this problem, we run equation (1) with country-product fixed effects. Columns 
5-8 report the results. Only the statistically significant negative effect on MFN tariffs 
on imports from excluded countries remains intact, whether in first differences or 
percentage changes. Again the results do not support evidence of significant trade 
diversion.  
 
 Finally, there is a danger of reverse causality if trade growth affects tariff 
changes. For example, an import surge could lead to higher MFN tariffs, thus leading 
to an upward bias in its coefficient. In the final four columns, we rerun the regressions 
using the lagged tariff changes as instruments for contemporaneous changes. The 
results point to stronger effects of tariff reductions on trade, suggesting that reverse 
causality is indeed a concern. Again, there is no evidence of reductions in preferential 
tariffs reducing trade from nonmembers. 
 
 To properly identify the impact of preferences in ASEAN, it is however 
necessary to understand how those preferences affect the policies of ASEAN 
members toward outsiders. Members agreed on a schedule of preferential tariff 
reduction starting in 1992, updating and adjusting it overtime. Meanwhile, most of 
them also cut their own MFN tariffs significantly, thus generating relatively low 
preferential margins. Were these large MFN tariff reductions influenced by the 
members’ decision to liberalize preferentially? This is what we seek to answer in the 
next section. 
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V. Preferences and external tariffs in ASEAN 
 
 We study in this section whether/how ASEAN governments altered their trade 
policies vis-à-vis outsiders following the introduction and deepening of preferences 
under AFTA. 
 
 Naturally, several factors (political economy forces, currency crisis, fiscal 
needs, etc.) affect a country’s external tariffs. We account for these factors by using a 
large variety of fixed effects, as in the trade regressions of the previous session. Those 
that are constant overtime are eliminated in the regressions when we take first 
differences. Thus, we estimate the following regression: 
 
(2) ΔMFNijt = γij + γjt + αΔPREFijt + υijt, 
 
where γij is a country-product fixed effect and γjt is a country-period fixed effect. 
Notice that, since equation (2) is specified in first-differences, these fixed effects 
correspond effectively to fixed trend effects, rather than fixed level effects. For 
robustness, we therefore report results both with and without these fixed effects.  In 
equation (2), a positive coefficient α would support a “building blocs” view of 
preferential liberalization, where lower preferential tariffs are associated with lower 
external tariffs. In contrast, a negative α would support a “stumbling blocs” view of 
preferential liberalization, where lower preferential tariffs are associated with higher 
external tariffs. 
 
 Despite our large number of fixed (trend) effects, there may still be forces 
omitted in regression equation (2) that induce governments to alter both their 
preferential and external tariffs. This would tend to make our estimated coefficient α 
statistically significant, but causality would not follow from PREF to MFN. We adopt 
a number of strategies to check whether the results from the basic regression 
correspond indeed to causation. 
 
 First, we re-run (2) with lagged ΔPREF. This neutralizes the effects of omitted 
variables that affect both MFN and PREF contemporaneously. Second, we introduce 
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in the regression, in turn, ΔMFNij,t-1 and MFNij,t-1, to control for autocorrelation in 
ΔMFN and for the fact that it is easier to lower MFN by more if it is high. Third, we 
replace lagged ΔPREF with the planned changes in preferential tariffs, agreed upon 
when AFTA was created, in 1992. Future shocks that might have affected the actual 
changes in PREF and MFN did not play a role in the negotiation of the preferential 
rates in 1992 (PREF92), unless they were fully anticipated. Finally, we also regress 
ΔMFN on the lagged changes in preferential margins, defined as the difference 
between the MFN and the preferential rates. Notice that the interpretation of the 
coefficient on lagged changes in the preferential margins is different: a negative 
coefficient indicates tariff complementarity (a higher preferential margin induces 
lower MFN tariffs), while a positive coefficient suggests tariff substitutability. 
 
 Table 4 reports the results. All regressions indicate a strong complementarity 
between changes in preferential tariffs and changes in MFN rates: if the former falls, 
the latter falls as well. This is observed whether we look at the preferential rates 
directly, the planned preferential rates, or the preferential margins. In addition, the 
results are not sensitive to the inclusion of country-product fixed effects. The 
magnitudes are also economically significant, ranging from .24 to .47 (for the 
preferential rates). This implies that a reduction of 10 percentage points in the intra-
AFTA import tariff leads to a fall between 2.4 and 4.7 percentage points in the 
country’s external tariff in the subsequent period.  In the remaining regressions, to be 
conservative, we only report results with the full set of fixed effects. 
 
 As indicated earlier, a concern about ASEAN is that preferences may not be 
used if the difference between intra-ASEAN and MFN rates is not sufficiently large. 
If so, the economic and political channels through which intra-bloc liberalization 
affects governments’ incentives to liberalize unilaterally against outsiders may be 
muted, or at least be weaker. Similarly, theory indicates that the impact of preferences 
on external tariffs should be more significant, the more important intra-bloc imports 
are. Looking for differential effects in products where the margin of preference is 
meaningful, as well as where intra-bloc imports are more or less prominent, can 
therefore provide a finer test for our hypothesis that changes in MFN tariffs are indeed 
being driven by changes in preferences. 
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 To look at these issues, we first construct the indicator variable BIGM, which 
is unity if the margin of preference is above x. We experiment with different 
thresholds: x = {2.5, 5, 7.5}. We then run the following regression: 
 
(3) ΔMFNijt = γij + γjt + αΔPREFijt-1 + β(ΔPREFijt-1 * BIGMijt-1) + ρBIGMijt-1 + υijt. 
 
Coefficient ρ tells us whether the presence of a large margin of preference has an 
independent impact on the changes in MFN tariffs. Coefficient β, on the interaction 
between ΔPREF and BIGM, indicates in turn whether the relationship between 
preferential and MFN tariffs is different in the presence of a large preferential margin.  
 
 Second, we define the variable WGHT as the share of imports coming from 
ASEAN members. Since this share is affected by the MFN tariffs after the 
introduction of AFTA, we use the share of imports from ASEAN members from the 
period right before AFTA came into force (i.e., 1992 or the first period for which 
trade data is available prior to 1993). We then interact WGHT with BIGM:15 
 
(4) ΔMFNijt = γij + γjt + αΔPREFijt-1 + β(WGHT ij * BIGMijt-1) + υijt. 
 
This approach is analogous to that followed by Estevadeordal et al. (2008). If β > 0, it 
indicates that, when the margin of preference is significant, higher intra-bloc imports 
lead to higher external tariffs, or “tariff substitutability,” whereas β < 0 reflects “tariff 
complementarity.” 
 
 Results are displayed is table 5. The first three columns show the results for 
regression (3) for each of the considered thresholds for BIGM. The presence of a large 
margin of preference by itself induces a reduction in the MFN tariff. Furthermore, the 
tariff complementarity obtained in the previous regressions is considerably stronger 
when a large margin is present. In fact, as the first column of table 5 indicates, tariff 
complementarity vanishes for products where the preferential margin is below 2.5, 
                                                 
15 Notice that, since WGHT does not vary overtime, its independent effect is fully absorbed by the fixed 
effect γij. 
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confirming that margins that are too small are ineffectual. This result mirrors those 
obtained by Estevadeordal et al. (2008) for Latin America. 
 
 The last three columns show the results for regression (4) for each of the three 
thresholds for BIGM. Again, we find tariff complementarity and that the presence of a 
large margin of preference by itself leads to reductions in the external tariff. We also 
observe that a higher intra-bloc share of imports is associated with reductions in the 
external tariffs. However, this effect is statistically significant only when the margin 
of preference is at least 7.5 percentage points. This result is in the same spirit of those 
of Estevadeordal et al. (2008) for Latin America,16 but is quantitatively different, as 
there WGHT proved to play a role in pushing external tariffs down even for margins 
that were just above 2.5 percentage points. One possible explanation for this 
difference is the level of aggregation. While our data for ASEAN is at the product 
level, Estevadeordal et al.’s data is much more aggregated, at the industry level (about 
100 of them). Thus, the finding in the Latin America study that higher shares of intra-
bloc imports drive MFN tariffs down even for relatively small preferential margins 
may be driven simply by its high level of aggregation. 
 
 Overall, our results in tables 4 and 5 provide extensive evidence that ASEAN 
countries dropped their MFN tariffs following reductions in preferential rates. 
Furthermore, our findings that this effect is stronger for goods where the margins and 
the (pre-agreement) share of intra-bloc imports are higher provide considerable 
support for a causal relationship. Still, if future changes in MFN tariffs are anticipated 
by the governments, their previous changes in preferential rates may simply reflect 
those anticipated lower MFN rates—i.e., our regressions may be capturing reverse 
causality. Relatedly, omitted variables that affect changes in both external and (with a 
lag) intra-bloc tariffs may be affecting our results as well. 
 
 To address these issues, we adopt an instrumental variable approach, where 
we instrument actual changes in preferential tariffs with the planned ones by the 
original six members in 1992, as outlined in their original schedule. Moreover, we 
                                                 
16 This result is related also to Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing’s (2008) finding that preferences affect 
intra-ASEAN trade only if the preferential margin is very high—in their case above 25 percentage 
points. 
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restrict the sample to period 4 (i.e., after 1998) onwards. Our rationale is as follows. 
First, it is largely implausible that actual changes in MFN tariffs in the post-Asian 
crisis period were anticipated in 1992, affecting those planned changes in intra-bloc 
trade restrictions. The same is true for shocks that could have affected both ΔMFN 
and lagged ΔPREF after the Asian currency crisis. Second, while planned and actual 
preferential changes are clearly correlated (the correlation drops from 0.99 in period 2 
to 0.34 in period 6, falling monotonically overtime), one can safely argue that planned 
preferences in 1992 did not independently affect the willingness of governments to 
alter their external trade policies after the Asian crisis of 1997-1998. 
 
 We show the results for these IV regressions in the first two columns of table 
6, where we instrument contemporaneous and lagged ΔPREF with contemporaneous 
and lagged ΔPREF92, respectively.17 The results reinforce our previous findings and 
in particular the causality mechanism: changes in preferential rates appear to have 
indeed caused subsequent changes in external tariffs in the same direction. 
Furthermore, this complementarity effect is stronger in the instrumented regressions. 
 
Finally, in the last two columns of table 6 we adopt a GMM procedure, adding 
lagged levels of preferential tariffs to instrument for lagged changes. In this 
specification, we also control for the lagged level of the MFN tariff to ensure our 
results are not driven by the fact that high tariffs can be reduced more substantially. It 
is also instrumented with lags. The tariff complementarity results remain strong.  In 
addition, we do find a negative coefficient on lagged MFN, suggesting that higher 
tariffs do tend to be reduced more. 
 
                                                 
17 First-stage results, omitted, confirm the strong correlation between ΔPREF post-period 3 and 
ΔPREF92. 
 22
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 In this paper we study how the formation of the ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement, established in 1993, has affected trade flows and trade policies vis-à-vis 
outsiders. AFTA provides a unique opportunity to analyze the effects of preferential 
trade integration, in that it involves ten countries that have been lowering tariffs on 
each other’s imports over time at very different paces across products. Moreover, very 
detailed data are available, and not only for the pace of actual preferential 
liberalization, but also for the members’ planned schedule of liberalization at the 
inception of AFTA in 1992. 
 
 We find that AFTA has been broadly benign, in the sense that it does not seem 
to be promoting trade within the bloc at the expense of trade with nonmembers. 
Furthermore, we find strong evidence that AFTA members have been responding to 
lower internal tariffs by reducing also their trade barriers on imports from outsiders. 
In this sense, AFTA has been clearly beneficial for the promotion of freer world trade. 
 
These findings corroborate those of Estevadeordal et al. (2008) for Latin 
America (and to a lesser extent also those of Lendle 2007 for some ASEAN 
members), reinforcing the view that regionalism promotes external liberalization and 
can be viewed as a “building bloc” toward free trade. On the other hand, our findings 
contrast sharply with those of Limão (2006) and Karacaovali and Limão (2008) for 
the United States and the European Union, which imply that regionalism constitutes a 
break on external liberalization and should be regarded instead as a “stumbling bloc” 
to global free trade. 
 
Why do we have such discrepant results across studies and trading blocs? 
While we cannot know for sure, one factor that is very likely behind these divergent 
results is indeed the stark difference between the countries analyzed in those studies. 
Since the multilateral system has not enforced much tariff reduction on developing 
countries, tariffs are relatively high there, creating a large potential for trade 
diversion. Lower external tariffs moderate that loss. The results of Estevadeordal et al. 
and of this paper suggest that this force is important in explaining changes in MFN 
tariffs of developing countries involved in free trade areas. In contrast, Limão focuses 
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on industrial countries. Tariffs were already quite low in the United States and the 
European Union at the onset of the Uruguay Round, which reduces the importance of 
this channel. In addition, the theoretical underpinnings that Limão uses to justify the 
importance of preferences in North-South agreements rely on regional blocs being 
formed for non-economic reasons—preferential treatment given in exchange for non-
economic benefits, such as cooperation on migration, drug trafficking or a global 
political agenda. This is not the case in South-South trade agreements, including 
AFTA, where the main goal is to exchange market access. Further research to 
confirm/disprove these presumptions would be very welcome. 
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Table 1 – MFN and preferential tariffs 
 
country   1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
ASEAN-6                               
Brunei MFN     3.75  2.76 2.71 2.68 2.63 2.63 2.6 2.14 2.11 2.61 
 PREF 3.64 2.54 2.42 1.87  1.31 1.37 1.19 0.94 0.97 0.94   1.01 
  Margin       1.88   1.45 1.34 1.49 1.69 1.66 1.66     1.6 
Indonesia MFN 17.88  15.06 13.57 12.35 12.35 8.81 8.25 6.89 6.9 6.95 6.95 6.95 6.91 
 PREF 16.03 16.03 14.36 9.48 8.1 6.7 5.19 4.57 3.63 2.14 2.2 1.51 1.5 1.5 
  Margin 1.85   0.7 4.09 4.25 5.65 3.62 3.68 3.26 4.76 4.75 5.44 5.45 5.41 
Malaysia MFN 11.06   6.77 6.21 6.26 8.17 8.36 8.35 8.35  7.35 7.18 7.18 
 PREF 7.27 6.77 6.29 4.18 3.78 3.17 2.9 2.96 2.64 2.18  2.1 2.01 0.69 
  Margin 3.79     2.59 2.43 3.09 5.27 5.4 5.71 6.17   5.25 5.17 6.49 
Philippines MFN 23.01 22.16 20.27 14.39 14.62 14.79 9.62 7.71 6.08 6.28 6.27 6.27  6.26 
 PREF 12.41 11.36 10.62 9.57 9.22 7.78 7.37 5.09 4.05 1.98 2.05 2.05  1.97 
  Margin 10.6 10.8 9.65 4.82 5.4 7.01 2.25 2.62 2.03 4.3 4.22 4.22   4.29 
Singapore MFN    0 0.32 0.07 0.07 0.06  0 0 0 0 0 0 
 PREF    0      0 0 0 0 0  
  Margin     0           0 0 0 0 0   
Thailand MFN     23.71  23.71 43.33 16.4  15.36     
 PREF 20.01 20.01 18.38 14.09  10.3 9.75 5.96 4.85 2 2.01    
  Margin       9.62   13.41 33.58 10.44   13.36         
 
(cont.) 
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Table 1 – MFN and preferential tariffs (cont.) 
 
  
+ 4                               
Cambodia MFN         16.46 16.41 16.41 15.81 14.26  14.18 
 PREF          8.87 7.83  9.08  6.85 
  Margin                 7.54 8.58   5.18   7.33 
Laos MFN       10.34 10.33 10.33 10.34  10.33 9.71  9.71 
 PREF         7.21   6.15 3.88  1.57 
  Margin               3.12     4.18 5.83   8.14 
Myanmar  MFN       5.54 5.51 5.49 5.51 5.51 5.51 5.6  5.6 
 PREF          4.8 4.81 4.26 4.29  3.36 
  Margin                 0.71 0.7 1.25 1.31   2.24 
Vietnam MFN       4.47 12.43 13.08  16.03 16.81 16.81 16.81 16.81 
 PREF       3.71 7.39 7.54 6.86 6.57 5.5 4.08 2.27 2.35 
  Margin           0.76 5.04 5.54   9.46 11.31 12.73 14.54 14.46 
 
Source: WITS and ASEAN Secretariat. 
 
Table 2 – Growth rates of ASEAN imports 
 
Brunei Darussalam 
 ASEAN ROW t-test p-value correlation 
1980-1993 10.45 6.91 0.85 0.41 0.351 
1993-2007 5.37 -1.07 0.49 0.64 0.330 
t-test 0.62 0.68    
p-value 0.54 0.50    
Indonesia 
 ASEAN ROW t-test p-value correlation 
1980-1993 5.43 7.97 -0.28 0.78 0.677 
1993-2007 14.49 4.93 3.04 0.01 0.813 
t-test 0.78 0.45    
p-value 0.44 0.66    
Malaysia 
 ASEAN ROW t-test p-value correlation 
1980-1993 12.57 10.37 0.81 0.43 0.786 
1993-2007 9.87 8.40 0.78 0.45 0.886 
t-test 0.53 0.33    
p-value 0.60 0.74    
Philippines 
 ASEAN ROW t-test p-value correlation 
1980-1993 7.78 4.97 0.53 0.61 0.575 
1993-2007 14.51 7.81 3.50 0.00 0.836 
t-test 1.01 0.48    
p-value 0.32 0.63    
Singapore 
 ASEAN ROW t-test p-value correlation 
1980-1993 10.21 8.93 0.59 0.57 0.819 
1993-2007 10.43 7.95 1.41 0.18 0.9 
t-test 0.04 0.19    
p-value 0.97 0.85    
Thailand 
 ASEAN ROW t-test p-value correlation 
1980-1993 12.94 12.01 0.21 0.84 0.647 
1993-2007 10.19 7.79 1.14 0.27 0.9 
t-test 0.40 0.58    
p-value 0.69 0.57    
  
Source: WITS.
Table 3 – The Effect of Tariffs on Trade  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES dlnROW dlnREG dlnROW dlnREG dlnROW dlnREG dlnROW dlnREG dlnROW dlnREG dlnROW dlnREG 
                          
dmfn 
-
0.005*** 0.001     
-
0.004*** 0.002     
-
0.010*** -0.007     
  [0.001] [0.001]     [0.001] [0.002]     [0.004] [0.006]     
dpref -0.003** 
-
0.006***     0.003 0     
-
0.022***
-
0.049***     
  [0.001] [0.002]     [0.002] [0.004]     [0.008] [0.014]     
dlnmfn     
-
0.574*** 0.203     
-
0.633*** 0.19     
-
2.227*** -0.928 
      [0.115] [0.194]     [0.169] [0.303]     [0.520] [0.927] 
dlnpref     -0.426** 
-
0.925***     0.249 -0.273     -1.498 
-
6.520*** 
      [0.178] [0.260]     [0.308] [0.489]     [1.179] [2.035] 
                          
Observations 65386 51891 53749 42301 65386 51891 53749 42301 46739 37919 36927 29726 
R-squared 0.088 0.018 0.076 0.017 0.388 0.343 0.403 0.365 0.072 0.013 0.056 0.008 
Fixed Effects                         
  Country-Year X X X X X X X X X X X X 
  Country-
Product         X X X X         
Robust standard errors in brackets           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1            
 
  
Table 4 – The Effect of Preferences on External Tariffs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
dpref 0.34***       0.25***       
  [0.01]       [0.02]       
L.dpref   0.33***       0.30***     
    [0.01]       [0.02]     
L.dpref92     0.47***       0.28***   
      [0.01]       [0.03]   
L.dmarg       
-
0.24***       
-
0.36***
        [0.01]       [0.01] 
                  
Observations 100694 66212 45852 63352 100694 66212 45852 63352 
R-squared 0.40 0.34 0.32 0.384 0.58 0.56 0.50 0.72 
Fixed Effects                 
  country-year  X X X X X X X X 
  country-product         X X X X 
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country-product level in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 1
 
Table 5 – The Effect of Preferences on External Tariffs: high preferential margins and high weights 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 margin=2.5 margin=5 margin=7.5 margin=2.5 margin=5 margin=7.5 
       
L.dpref -0.01 0.03** 0.07*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
L.dpref * L.bigm 0.36*** 0.34*** 0.32***    
 [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]    
L.bigm -1.99*** -2.34*** -2.18*** -3.02*** -3.34*** -3.29*** 
 [0.13] [0.15] [0.19] [0.17] [0.19] [0.21] 
wght * L.bigm    -0.24 -0.49 -1.59** 
    [0.74] [0.75] [0.77] 
       
       
Observations 66212 66212 66212 34234 34234 34234 
R-squared 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.55 
All regressions run with country-period and country-product fixed effects. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country-product 
level in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6 – The Effect of Preferential Tariffs on External Tariffs; IV and GMM 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 IV IV GMM GMM 
     
dpref 0.77***  1.55***  
 [0.04]  [0.03]  
L.dpref  0.54***  1.00*** 
  [0.02]  [0.03] 
L.mfn   -0.11*** -0.32*** 
   [0.01] [0.01] 
     
Observations 45916 45852 67415 70834 
R-squared 0.05 0.10   
All regressions run with country-period and country-product fixed effects (demeaned 
in the IV regressions). Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country-
product level in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 1
 
Figure 1 – Average tariffs, selected countries 
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(b) Malaysia Average Tariffs
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(c) Philippines Average Tariffs
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Figure 2 – Share of intra-ASEAN trade 
 
(a) All initial members 
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(b) By country 
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Figure 3 – ASEAN intra-bloc and external imports (in logs) 
 
(a) All initial members 
 
23
24
25
26
27
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Period
lnreg lnrow
ASEAN Initial Members
 
 
 5
 
(b) By country 
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